Intimidating a police officer
He wrote: “Police officers must often act quickly and decisively, as a delay in response could have dire consequences or even constitute dereliction of duty. Police officers performing their valuable and often dangerous duties cannot be made to fear criminal charges any time an arrest or detention is made with what turns out to be less than probable cause. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion, but only for noteworthy cases.
had not committed a crime, then a reasonable police officer in Steele’s position would have understood that probable cause was clearly lacking. (T)here is nothing to indicate that the trial court’s failure to explain a higher standard of loss-of-privilege for police officers affected Steele’s convictions for abduction.” In reinstating Steele’s abduction convictions, Justice O’Neill emphasized that today’s ruling is not intended to make police officers liable to criminal prosecution for making an arrest except under the extreme circumstances present in this case. Justice Terrence O’Donnell dissented without opinion. Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media.
Consequently, we have little difficulty in concluding that a threat to sexually assault the child of an individual police officer by a person who is under arrest, handcuffed, and in the patrol car, does not constitute a terrorist act within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 61-6-24(a)(3)(B)(iii) because the threatened action was not directed at intimidating or coercing the conduct of a branch or level of government.
To hold otherwise would not only require us to turn a blind eye to the overarching objective of our state’s anti-terrorism law but would run the risk of trivializing the offense at issue.
To whom or what would the majority believe a valid terroristic threat in such a setting should instead be made? It is simply absurd therefore to contend that Sergeant A. He also indicated that he sometimes made arrests with less than probable cause in order to obtain the cooperation of the arrested person or other witnesses. The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the First District’s ruling vacating Steele’s abduction convictions. 2921.03 makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly take certain actions to influence, intimidate, or hinder a witness, a party official, or a public servant in the discharge of a duty. The ways in which it is illegal to exert such improper influence are by knowingly (1) using force, (2) unlawfully threatening harm against any person or property, (3) using a materially false or fraudulent writing in any way with malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness.” Pointing to multiple provisions in other state laws that expressly exempt law enforcement personnel from criminal prosecution for conduct such as possession of illegal drugs and carrying weapons in prohibited places, Justice O’Neill noted that the legislature included no such exception in the intimidation statute. We are merely looking for the absence of plain error.” “The totality of the instructions and of the record in this case does not support a finding of plain error, particularly when considering Steele’s intimidation and abduction charges together. The court of appeals held that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the good-faith element of an officer’s arrest privilege constituted “plain error,” and therefore required reversal of Steele’s convictions for abduction despite his agreement to the defective instruction. However, it must be remembered that we are not looking for the ideal in this case. M.’s mother, and to the prosecutor that he knew that R. A jury trial was held, at which Steele did not testify. In affirming the First District’s holding that Steele was properly convicted of intimidation, Justice O’Neill wrote: “Steele proposes that a police officer cannot be prosecuted for the offense of intimidation, in violation of R. 2921.03(A), based on actions taken by the police officer while conducting an interrogation.
Steele admitted that he had told Alicia that he did not think R. The prosecutor’s office indicted Steele on two counts of abduction, three counts of extortion, two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of intimidation, all with firearm specifications. The court also agreed to review Steele’s cross-claim that the First District erred in affirming his conviction for intimidation. was in detention, Steele repeatedly persuaded Alicia Maxton to meet with him under the guise of talking about R.